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The paper
I study the effect of meeting an absolute performance target in tests on
subsequent behaviour by
• using a linked dataset of students in compulsory education in England with
information on
– test scores in English, Maths and Science
– proxies for behaviour: absence from school, bullying, suspension, expulsion
and police warning
• exploiting a local randomised experiment at discontinuities in test scores
to identify the effect
I find that meeting a performance target has a negative but only marginally
significant effect on behaviour, e.g. the probability of unauthorised absence
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Students’ behaviour by achievement in tests
Modest variation in observed behaviour of students scoring below the expected
target (3) w.r.t. those at the target (4) in survey data
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Broader question
Performance targets help individuals to build human capital or signal ability
However, targets may have unintended consequences
• change individuals’ beliefs about ability
• induce low effort by high ability individuals absent pay on performance
• evidence in employment contracts (Prendergast (1999)) but not on, e.g. ab-
sence or police warnings
Can one test of the effect of performance targets on behaviour to inform
• education policy in England (Every Child Matters) and beyond (No Child Left
Behind in the USA)?
• public policy more broadly, e.g. employment contracts, promotions, charity?
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Intution of the treatment
In tests at age 11 students face performance targets that the Department
of Education set for them
Meeting a target reassures a student that (s)he will succeed in tests in secondary
school, as well as parents and schools
Tests are graded using a continuous scale and externally
Tests scores are instead disclosed using categorical values
• below target (3)
• at or above the expected target (4)
• at or above a target for high ability students (5)
The institutional setting offers a local randomised experiment if students
scoring 3.9, the control, versus 4.1, the treated are identical in (un)observables
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Institutional setting: school curriculum in the UK
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Primary/ Age Stage Year Assessment Expected
Secondary achievement level
3-4 Early Years
Foundation
Stage (EYFS)
4-5 EYFS Reception Tests 6-9/13
elements
5-6 Key Stage 1 1
6-7 2 Teacher assessments 2
in English, Maths
Primary and Science (EMS)
School 7-8 Key Stage 2 3
8-9 4
9-10 5
10-11 6 National and 4
teacher
assessments
in EMS
11-12 Key Stage 3 7 Teacher
assessments
12-13 8 Teacher
assessments
13-14 9 Teacher 5 or 6
assessments
in EMS and
foundation
Secondary subjects
School 14-15 Key Stage 4 10 Some children
take GCSEs
15-16 11 Most children 5 A*-C or
take GCSEs or equivalent
other national including
qualifications English
and Maths
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Disclosure of tests results to students
Students obtain categorical results {2,3,4,5} in the grade sheet and targets are
written at the bottom
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Three scores in tests at Key Stage 2
KS2 Maths level 3 KS2 Maths level 4 KS2 Maths level 5
KS2 KS2 KS2 KS2 KS2 KS2 KS2 KS2 KS2
Science Science Science Science Science Science Science Science Science
level 3 level 4 level 5 level 3 level 4 level 5 level 3 level 4 level 5
KS2 English level 3 3.39 6.15 0.16 0.46 4.42 0.46 0.00 0.12 0.04
KS2 English level 4 1.07 8.50 0.33 0.48 23.66 7.23 0.01 3.32 5.71
KS2 English level 5 0.00 0.42 0.10 0.00 5.36 5.82 0.00 2.17 14.72
I use test score by subject and the mean score in all tests as students have
to meet targets in each test
Using mean score is tenable under the assumption that few/no student
meets
• high targets in two tests but fails one
• a high target in one tests and fails the other two
7
Outcomes (LSYPE survey questionnaire)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Name Question Time window Mean
w.r.t. survey
(Years before)
Truancy In the last 12 months, have you ever played truant, that is missed Up to 1 year 0.14
school without permission, even if it was only for a half day or a
single lesson?
One month absence Can I check, in the last 12 months, has (name) Up to 1 year 0.03
been off school for a continuous period of 1 month or more,
other than for school holidays?
Being bullied The next question is about any bullying or other bad behaviour from Up to 1 year 0.43
other pupils at (his/her) school that you know have happened to
(name) in the last 12 months. Have any of these things happened to
(name) at school in the last 12 months?
1. Called names by other pupils at his/her school
2. Sent offensive or hurtful text messages or emails
3. Shut out from groups of other pupils or from joining in things
4. Made to give other pupils his or her money or belongings
5. Threatened by other pupils with being hit or kicked or with other
violence
6. Actually being hit or kicked or attacked in any other way by other
pupils
7. Any other sort of bullying
8. No, none of these things have happened in the last 12 months
Suspension Has (name) been temporarily excluded, that is Up to 3 years 0.10
suspended, from a school for a time, in the past 3 years?
Expulsion Has (name ) been permanently excluded, that is Up to 3 years 0.01
expelled from school for good, in the past 3 years?
Police warning Have the police got in touch with you (or your husband/wife/partner) Up to 3 years 0.07
about (name) because of something he/she had done in the last 3 years?
1. Yes , in last 3 years; 2. No; 3. Not in the last three years
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Timing of events and data collection
-
Key Stage 2
tests
May
2001
Key Stage 2
results
July
2001
September
2001
Students’
behaviour
March 2001 -
October 2004
Key Stage 3
tests
May
2004
Key Stage 3
results
July
2004
ﬀ -
Primary education
ﬀ -
Secondary education
A cohort of students
• sit tests in May 2001 and obtain test results in July 2001
• start secondary school in September 2001
Survey data are collected in March-October 2004 on the behaviour of a nationally
representative subsample of the cohort
Administrative data on students’ test scores is linked to survey data on their
behaviour
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Summary statistics: outcome variables
Variable Names All Females Males
Outcome variables
Truancy 0.14 0.14 0.14
One month absence 0.03 0.03 0.03
Victim of bullying 0.43 0.45 0.39
Suspension 0.10 0.06 0.14
Expulsion 0.01 0.01 0.01
Police warning 0.07 0.05 0.10
Missingness in outcome variables
Missing: truancy 0.06 0.06 0.06
Missing: one month absence 0.07 0.07 0.06
Missing: bullying victim 0.10 0.09 0.11
Missing: suspension 0.05 0.05 0.05
Missing: expulsion 0.05 0.05 0.05
Missing: police warning 0.06 0.05 0.06
Total n. observations 15770 7727 8043
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Summary statistics: covariates
Variable Names All Females Males
Covariates: Key Stage 2 test scores
Fine grade average test score 4.57 4.58 4.55
S.d. 0.62 0.60 0.64
English fine grade test score 4.44 4.55 4.33
S.d. 0.73 0.68 0.75
Maths fine grade test score 4.45 4.41 4.49
S.d. 0.81 0.78 0.83
Science fine grade test score 4.74 4.73 4.75
S.d. 0.61 0.59 0.62
Covariates: Key Stage 2 school type
Community school 0.60 0.54 0.67
Voluntary aided school 0.16 0.15 0.18
Voluntary controlled school 0.09 0.08 0.10
Foundation school 0.03 0.03 0.03
Covariates: gender and ethnicity
Male 0.45 0.00 1.00
Asian 0.06 0.07 0.07
Black 0.03 0.03 0.02
Other 0.05 0.05 0.05
White 0.86 0.85 0.86
Covariates: socio-economic background
Non-SEN 0.82 0.87 0.77
SEN statement 0.04 0.02 0.05
SEN non-statemented 0.14 0.11 0.18
Free school meals 0.13 0.11 0.14
English additional language 0.18 0.27 0.08
Main parent has a degree 0.13 0.15 0.11
Main parent higher education 0.13 0.13 0.13
Main parent GCSE 0.45 0.44 0.46
Main parent other qualification 0.11 0.10 0.11
Main parent no qualification 0.18 0.18 0.18
Total n. observations 15770 7727 8043
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Research design
B = α + βOLST + U1 (1)
The outcome variable B
• is a binary measure of behaviour
• can be interpreted as the observable proxy of whether a latent variable B∗ about
the importance of school is smaller than a threshold B¯∗ or B = I{B∗ < B¯∗}
The covariate T is a continuous measure of test score
βOLS measures the change in the probability of behaviour, e.g. a student
is truant, due to a unit increase in test score T
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Research design (cont.d)
Gc = I{T ≥ T¯c} (2)
B = f (T ) + βRDGc + U2 (3)
A threshold T¯c ∈ {3, 4, 5} in test score T determines whether a student meets a
performance target Gc
βRD
• measures the change in the probability of behaviour that meeting a
target w.r.t. not meeting it leads to
• is unbiased as it compares students whose test score is just above the target
versus those with a score just below and are otherwise identical
βOLS may capture a spurious effect on behaviour of meeting a performance
target, e.g. a change in score from 4.5 to 5.5, due to unobserved ability
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Estimation of a sharp regression discontinuity design
• Estimate smooth polynomials in test scores separately for students to the
left and right of a threshold
• Choose the optimal bandwidth by using the choice rule in Imbens and Kalya-
naraman (2009)
• Use a window of size 2 and centered around each threshold, e.g. threshold 4
+/- 1
• Carry out robustness checks to address major concerns about the validity of
the design
– Pre-treatment values confound assignment around a threshold
– Manipulation of test scores around the threshold, e.g. by test examiners
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Estimation using a single test score and the average score
Estimates of the effect of meeting a performance target in the English test on
behaviour
• imply a ceteris paribus assumption about scores in Maths and Science tests
• are negative but insignificant
• hardly satisfy the identifying assumption that the difference in means of
conditional residuals U in the left and right neighbourhood of a threshold is
insignificantly different from zero, limT↑T¯cE[U |T ]− limT↓T¯cE[U |T ]
A solution to capture the requirement of meeting the expected target in all
tests
• is to use the average test score
• holds under the assumption that variation in scores in triplets of test is negli-
gible for a student
15
Regression Discontinuity plots: absence and being bullied
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OLS and RD estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
All sample Females Males
OLS RD 2-3 RD 3-4 RD 4-5 OLS RD 2-3 RD 3-4 RD 4-5 OLS RD 2-3 RD 3-4 RD 4-5
Truancy -.03 .08 -.05 -.01 -.03 -.07 -.02 .03 -.03 .12 -.06 -.06
(.01)∗∗∗ (.07) (.04) (.02) (.01)∗∗∗ (.11) (.04) (.03) (.01)∗∗∗ (.08) (.04) (.02)∗∗∗
Obs. 9858 1729 7119 8128 9858 800 3529 4070 9858 929 3590 4058
One month absence -.02 -.03 -.004 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.007 -.01 -.02 -.03 .01 -.02
(.005)∗∗∗ (.04) (.01) (.01)∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.06) (.02) (.02) (.005)∗∗∗ (.06) (.02) (.01)
Obs. 9540 1634 6837 7905 9540 741 3360 3928 9540 893 3477 3977
Being bullied -.09 -.15 .04 -.04 -.09 -.26 .06 -.07 -.09 -.12 .01 -.05
(.02)∗∗∗ (.08)∗ (.03) (.02)∗ (.02)∗∗∗ (.09)∗∗∗ (.05) (.04)∗ (.02)∗∗∗ (.12) (.05) (.04)
Obs. 9119 1586 6552 7532 9119 722 3255 3797 9119 864 3297 3735
Suspension -.03 .006 .03 -.02 -.03 .28 .0004 .01 -.03 -.15 .04 -.05
(.008)∗∗∗ (.06) (.02) (.02) (.008)∗∗∗ (.12)∗∗ (.03) (.02) (.008)∗∗∗ (.10) (.03) (.03)
Obs. 9657 1676 6936 7980 9657 759 3424 3982 9657 917 3512 3998
Expulsion -.0009 -.004 -.0009 .004 -.0009 .03 .006 .005 -.0009 -.01 -.009 .003
(.0006) (.04) (.005) (.002)∗ (.0006) (.04) (.004) (.004) (.0006) (.05) (.009) (.003)
Obs. 9674 1679 6948 7994 9674 762 3426 3984 9674 917 3522 4010
Police warning -.03 .10 .02 -.008 -.03 .12 -.02 .005 -.03 .04 .06 -.01
(.007)∗∗∗ (.06) (.02) (.01) (.007)∗∗∗ (.12) (.03) (.01) (.007)∗∗∗ (.08) (.03)∗ (.02)
Obs. 9615 1666 6898 7948 9615 761 3415 3972 9615 905 3483 3976
• Effects are (not ) significant at the expected target in (full sample) sub-samples
by gender
• OLS estimates are downward biased with respect to RD ones
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Robustness check: pre-treatment values do not lead to ”jumps”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Achievement cutoff 3 Achievement cutoff 4 Achievement cutoff 5
Left Right P-value Left Right P-value Left Right P-value
Male 0.59 0.67 0.15 0.49 0.52 0.22 0.45 0.50 0.06
Teacher Assessment Test scores
English lev. 2 0.46 0.56 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.88 . . .
English lev. 3 0.43 0.38 0.73 0.52 0.56 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.42
English lev. 4 0.02 -0.00 0.85 0.41 0.38 0.75 0.55 0.57 0.28
Maths lev. 2 0.31 0.50 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.83 . . .
Maths lev. 3 0.60 0.41 0.99 0.60 0.53 0.94 0.00 -0.00 0.88
Maths lev. 4 0.00 -0.00 0.53 0.35 0.42 0.05 0.48 0.56 0.04
Science lev. 2 0.25 0.22 0.67 0.00 -0.00 0.79 . . .
Science lev. 3 0.67 0.71 0.35 0.26 0.28 0.37 0.00 -0.00 0.75
Science lev. 4 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.69 0.67 0.66 0.41 0.43 0.27
School type at Key Stage 2
VA school 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.69 0.20 0.24 0.08
VC school 0.10 0.08 0.61 0.09 0.08 0.59 0.09 0.10 0.34
Found.n school -0.00 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.62 0.03 0.03 0.26
Ethnicity
Black 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.81 0.06 0.06 0.53
Asian 0.31 0.24 0.80 0.19 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.53
Other 0.04 0.07 0.30 0.05 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.07 0.23
Socio-economic background
SEN statement 0.14 0.21 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.22
SEN non-statemented 0.64 0.53 0.92 0.22 0.29 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04
FSM 0.41 0.44 0.31 0.24 0.26 0.30 0.13 0.13 0.38
EAL 0.35 0.29 0.78 0.23 0.26 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.43
Main parent (MP)
MP with a degree 0.01 0.02 0.35 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.01
MP higher education 0.11 0.02 0.96 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.84
MP GCSE 0.23 0.29 0.19 0.43 0.36 0.96 0.49 0.45 0.87
MP other qualification 0.16 0.20 0.26 0.15 0.13 0.81 0.07 0.10 0.07
MP’s father with a degree 0.03 0.01 0.68 0.06 0.05 0.75 0.06 0.08 0.15
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Robustness check: gaming at thresholds
An undersmoothed histogram of the average test score shows no compelling evi-
dence of gaming around thresholds
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Robustness check: test for gaming at thresholds (McCrary (2008))
No rejection of the null hypothesis of no gaming around thresholds in McCrary
(2008)
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Additional robustness check: estimation window
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Achievement cutoff 3 Achievement cutoff 4 Achievement cutoff 5
2-4 2.05-3.95 2.15-3.85 2.25-3.75 3-5 3.1-4.9 3.3-4.7 3.5-4.5 4-6 4.1-5.9 4.3-5.7 4.5-5.5
Truancy .08 .09 .08 .08 -.05 -.05 -.04 -.007 -.01 -.005 -.005 -.008
(.07) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.05) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Obs. 1729 1577 1330 1073 7119 6436 5006 3492 8128 7772 6802 5417
One month absence -.03 -.04 -.04 -.03 -.004 -.0004 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.01)∗ (.01)∗ (.01) (.01)∗
Obs. 1634 1483 1257 1021 6837 6173 4781 3305 7905 7553 6634 5312
Victim of bullying -.15 -.14 -.15 -.15 .04 .04 .03 .03 -.04 -.04 -.06 -.04
(.08)∗ (.09)∗ (.08)∗ (.08)∗ (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.02)∗ (.02)∗ (.03)∗ (.04)
Obs. 1586 1442 1226 998 6552 5921 4594 3181 7532 7196 6325 5044
Suspension .006 -.02 -.01 .009 .03 .03 .05 .05 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02
(.06) (.07) (.06) (.08) (.02) (.02) (.03)∗ (.03)∗ (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01)
Obs. 1676 1523 1293 1051 6936 6265 4856 3357 7980 7622 6694 5357
Expulsion -.004 -.006 -.004 -.004 -.0009 -.002 -.001 .0006 .004 .003 .004 .003
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.002)∗ (.003) (.003) (.003)
Obs. 1679 1526 1296 1054 6948 6279 4869 3367 7994 7636 6704 5363
Police warnings .10 .13 .13 .10 .02 .02 .02 .03 -.008 -.007 -.007 -.006
(.06) (.07)∗ (.07)∗ (.06) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02)
Obs. 1666 1513 1284 1043 6898 6234 4832 3346 7948 7591 6670 5337
Varying the size of the window that is centered on a threshold varies the number
of observations but it does not alter the sign and precision of the RD estimates
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Additional robustness check: irrelevant thresholds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
Achievement cutoff 3 Achievement cutoff 4 Achievement cutoff 5
3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5
Truancy .08 -.11 -.006 .05 -.0008 .006 -.05 .03 .04 -.11 -.008 -.007 -.01 .001 .01 -.001 .002 -.02
(.07) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.08) (.08) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03)∗∗∗ (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.02)
Obs. 1739 1739 1739 1739 1739 1739 7134 7134 7134 7134 7134 7134 8129 8129 8129 8129 8129 8129
One month
absence -.03 .03 .07 .07 -.03 -.03 -.004 .01 .009 -.004 -.003 -.001 -.02 -.001 .003 -.006 .01 -.02
(.04) (.04) (.04)∗∗ (.04)∗ (.04) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)∗ (.008) (.01) (.008) (.01) (.008)∗∗
Obs. 1640 1640 1640 1640 1640 1640 6850 6850 6850 6850 6850 6850 7906 7906 7906 7906 7906 7906
Victim of
bullying -.15 .12 -.14 .14 .03 .006 .04 .07 .03 .003 .02 .006 -.04 .02 .03 -.02 -.01 -.09
(.08)∗ (.09) (.07)∗ (.07)∗ (.07) (.08) (.03) (.03)∗∗ (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.02)∗ (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.05)∗
Obs. 1592 1592 1592 1592 1592 1592 6564 6564 6564 6564 6564 6564 7533 7533 7533 7533 7533 7533
Suspension .001 .009 .01 .08 -.01 -.002 .03 .03 -.03 -.005 .02 .004 -.02 -.006 .02 .005 -.05 -.005
(.06) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.02)∗∗∗ (.02)
Obs. 1682 1682 1682 1682 1682 1682 6949 6949 6949 6949 6949 6949 7981 7981 7981 7981 7981 7981
Expulsion -.004 .03 .01 .0009 .03 .01 -.0009 -.006 -.0001 -.003 .001 .004 .005 -.0008
(.04) (.04) (.02) (.02) (.01)∗ (.01) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.005) (.004) (.002)∗ (.004) (.003)
Obs. 1685 1685 1685 1685 1685 1685 6961 6961 6961 6961 6961 7995 7995 7995
Police
warning .10 -.09 .08 .06 .03 -.06 .02 -.02 -.007 .003 -.009 .008 -.008 .002 .009 .02 -.04 -.007
(.06) (.07) (.04)∗ (.04) (.05) (.04) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01)∗∗∗ (.008)
Obs. 1672 1672 1672 1672 1672 1672 6911 6911 6911 6911 6911 6911 7949 7949 7949 7949 7949 7949
Estimating the effect of targets by using irrelevant thresholds, e.g. 4.1 instead of
4, leads to very few significant RD estimates
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Discussion
The research design and the institutional setting offer a valuable test to
• assess behavioural effects of performance targets
• inform education and public policies in the future (Urquiola and Verhoogen
(2009)) in the UK and abroad
• little significant estimates are reassuring evidence for education policies
in the UK
Heterogeneity in the estimates by ability, gender, type of outcome and par-
ents’ education suggest nature-nurture tradeoff (Lizzeri and Siniscalchi (2008)).
The effects
• are greater for implicit targets than for the expected target
• on the probability of police warning are greater for males than for females and
viceversa for other outcomes
• are greater for students whose parents have a low education level
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Contribution to the literature and policy debate
Mixed evidence on behavioural effects of characteristics of the institutional
setting in education (Reback (2010), Gaviria and Raphael (2001) and Dee (2004))
Positive non-market returns to education in adulthood (Grossman (2006) and
Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2009))
Effect of achievement in education today on achievement tomorrow (Az-
mat and Iriberri (2009) and Bandiera et al. (2009))
Considerable investment by policy-makers in studying the determinants of
• achievement gaps and consequences in adulthood, e.g. No Child Left Behind
(USA)
• well-being in young age and aulthood, e.g. Every Child Matters (UK)
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Future work
• Study the relationship among motivation, effort and achievement (De Fraja
et al. (2010))
• Study the effect of achievement on behaviour in secondary school and on college
choices and outcomes
• Set up a statistical design to inform policy decisions on the effect of X on Y
and of Y on X by exploiting linked data
25
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